The State of Utah v. Pearl Topanotes : Reply Brief by Utah Supreme Court
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs
2001
The State of Utah v. Pearl Topanotes : Reply Brief
Utah Supreme Court
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc2
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Linda M. Jones; Salt Lake County Legal Defender Assoc.; Attorney for Petitioner.
Marian Decker; Assistant Attorney General; Mark L. Shurtleff; Utah Attorney General; Attorneys
for Respondent.
This Reply Brief is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme Court
Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.
Recommended Citation
Reply Brief, Utah v. Topanotes, No. 20010127.00 (Utah Supreme Court, 2001).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc2/1760
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH 
Plaintiff/Respondent, 
v. 
PEARL TOPANOTES, 
Defendant/Petitioner. 
Case No. 20010127-SC 
Priority No. 13 
REPL Y BRIEF OF CROSS-PETITIONER 
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI 
TO THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
LINDA M. JONES 
SALT LAKE COUNTY LEGAL 
DEFENDER ASSOC. 
424 East 500 South, Suite 300 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
MARIAN DECKER 
Assistant Attorney General 
MARK L. SHURTLEFF 
Utah Attorney General 
160 East 300 South, 6th Floor 
P.O. Box 140854 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0854 
Attorney for Petitioner 
Attorneys for Respondent and Cross-
Petitioner 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH 
Plaintiff/Respondent, 
v. 
PEARL TOPANOTES, 
Defendant/Petitioner. 
Case No. 20010127-SC 
Priority No. 13 
REPLY BRIEF OF CROSS-PETITIONER 
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI 
TO THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
LINDA M. JONES 
SALT LAKE COUNTY LEGAL 
DEFENDER ASSOC. 
424 East 500 South, Suite 300 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
MARIAN DECKER 
Assistant Attorney General 
MARK L. SHURTLEFF 
Utah Attorney General 
160 East 300 South, 6th Floor 
P.O. Box 140854 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0854 
Attorney for Petitioner 
Attorneys for Respondent and Cross-
Petitioner 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
Page 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ii 
RESPONSE TO DEFENDANT'S MISCHARACTERIZATION 
OF THE SCOPE OF THE INEVITABLE DISCOVERY EXCEPTION 1 
RESPONSE TO DEFENDANT'S OVERBROAD 
CHARACTERIZATIONS OF THE RECORD 8 
RESPONSE TO DEFENDANT'S CHARACTERIZATION OF THE 
STATE'S INEVITABLE DISCOVERY THEORY: THE WARRANTS 
CHECK WAS AN ESTABLISHED ROUTINE THAT WAS GOING TO 
BE PERFORMED WHETHER DEFENDANT IDENTIFIED HERSELF 
VERBALLY OR VIA IDENTIFICATION 11 
CONCLUSION 13 
ADDENDUM - None required 
i 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
FEDERAL CASES 
Nixv. Williams, 467 U.S. 431 (1984) 3,4,5,7, 12 
United States v. Griffin, 48 F.3d 1147 (10th Cir.), 
cert, denied, 515 U.S. 1168 (1995) 5 
United States v. Mammons, 152 F.3d 1025 (8th Cir. 1998), 
cert, denied, 119 S.Ct. 1135(1999) 6 
United States v. Haro-Salcedo, 107 F.3d 769 (10th Cir. 1997) 5 
United States v. Kennedy, 61 F.3d 494 (6th Cir. 1995), 
cert, denied, 517 U.S. 119 (1996) 3, 5, 6, 7, 8, 12 
United States v. Larsen, 127 F.3d 984 (10th Cir. 1997), 
cert, denied, 522 U.S. 1140 (1998) 4, 5, 6, 7, 11 
United States v. Owen, 782 F.2d 146 (10th Cir. 1986) 7 
United States v. Williams, 980 F. Supp. 1225 (D. Utah 1997), 
affirmed without published opinion, 183 F.3d 876 (10th Cir. 1999) 5 
STATE CASES 
Salt Lake City v. Ray, 2000 UT App 55, 998 P.2d 274 10 
State v. Genovesi, 909 P.2d 916 (Utah App. 1995) 7 
State v. James, 1999 UT App 17, 977 P.2d 489 2 
State v. James, 2000 UT 80, 13 P.3d 576 1, 2, 3, 6 
State v. Miller, 709 P.2d 225 (Ore. 1985), 
cert, denied, 475 U.S. 1141 (1986) 3 
ii 
State v. Sampson, 808 P.2d 1100 (Utah App. 1990), 
cert, denied, 817 P.2d 327 (Utah 1991) 5 
State v. Topanotes, 2000 UT App 311,14 P.3d 695, 
cert, granted, 29 P3d 1 (Utah 2001) 10, 12 
OTHER WORK CITED 
LaFave, Search and Seizure § 11.4 3,6,7 
in 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH : 
Plaintiff/Respondent, : Case No. 20010127-SC 
v. : 
PEARL TOPANOTES, : Priority No. 13 
Defendant/Petitioner. : 
REPL Y BRIEF OF CROSS-PETITIONER 
RESPONSE TO DEFENDANT'S MISCHARACTERIZATION OF 
THE SCOPE OF THE INEVITABLE DISCOVERY EXCEPTION 
At the outset of the State's reply it is necessary to clarify the parameters of the 
inevitable discovery exception because defendant erroneously suggests that, in order to 
trigger the exception, "the [SJtate must establish by a preponderance of the evidence that 
the items in issue would have been discovered shortly (inevitably) through lawful means 
already under way." Cond. Cross-Resp. Br. at 6 (emphasis added). This is precisely the 
erroneously narrow view of the inevitable discovery exception that this Court rejected in 
State v. James, 2000 UT 80, fflj 15-16,13 P.3d 576. 
James was detained in his driveway for D.U.I. James, 2000 UT 80, f 2. The 
officer opened the driver's side door of James truck and asked him to step out. James, 
2000 UT 80, % 3. Once the door was open, the officer saw an open beer can on the floor 
of the cab. Id. When James stepped from his truck the officer observed other indicia of 
intoxication. Id. James subsequently failed a standard field sobriety test. James, 2000 
UT80,^4. 
On appeal from the D.U.I, conviction, the court of appeals held that the officer's 
opening of the vehicle door constituted an illegal search. James, 2000 UT 80, <| 6. The 
court of appeals then discussed and rejected the State's argument that the D.U.I. evidence 
would have inevitably been discovered. Id. Specifically, the court of appeals held that 
the inevitable discovery exception required an "entirely independent, alternate, 
intervening, appreciably attenuated investigation aside from the tainted investigation." 
State v. James, 1999 UT App 17, ^  21, 977 P.2d 489. 
On certiorari, this Court reversed the court of appeals, holding that the opening of 
the driver's door did not amount to an illegal search. James, 2000 UT 80, ffl[ 9-13. Even 
though it was "immaterial" to the resolution of the case, the Court also addressed the 
State's concerns that the court of appeals' flawed inevitable discovery analysis "[would] 
establish incorrect precedent." Id. at |^ 13. As recognized by the Court, 
[t]he inevitable discovery "exception" has been described as an exception to 
the exclusionary rule, which dictates that evidence obtained by virtue of 
illegal police activity must be suppressed at trial. The exception provides 
that evidence that would have been obtained regardless of illegal police 
activity will not be suppressed because to do so would violate the 
underlying policy of the exclusionary rule—which is to place the police in a 
position that is neither better nor worse than it would have been absent the 
illegal activity. 
James, 2000 UT 80, ^  14. The Court went on to observe that the criteria set forth by the 
court of appeals was "not required by the inevitable discovery exception, but [were] 
2 
instead merely descriptive of a subcategory of cases falling within the 'independent 
source doctrine.'" James, 2000 UT 80, ^  15. As further recognized by the Court, the 
independent source doctrine describes only "one method of satisfying the inevitable 
discovery exception which is to demonstrate that the same evidence uncovered by illegal 
police activity would have been obtained by an entirely independent, prior investigation." 
Id. Therefore, the inevitable discovery exception "does not necessarily include the 
elements dictated by the court of appeals," id., or in this case, by defendant. Cond. Cross-
Resp. Br. at 6-7. Put another way, the independent source doctrine is "not coextensive" 
with the broader inevitable discovery exception which requires only that the prosecution 
"'establish by a preponderance of the evidence that the information ultimately would have 
been discovered by lawful means.'" Id. at J^ 16 (quoting Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431, 
444 (1984)). Accord State v. Miller, 709 P.2d 225, 242 (Ore. 1985) ("Under federal 
constitutional analysis, the major requirement of the inevitable discovery doctrine is that 
the evidence would have been discovered, absent the illegality, by proper and predictable 
investigatory procedures."), cert, denied, 475 U.S. 1141 (1986); United States v. 
Kennedy, 61 F.3d 494, 499 (6th Cir. 1995) ("[T]he inevitable discovery exception to the 
exclusionary rule applies when the government can demonstrate either the existence of an 
independent, untainted investigation that inevitably would have uncovered the same 
evidence or other compelling facts establishing that the disputed evidence inevitably 
would have been discovered."), cert, denied, 517 U.S. 119 (1996). See also LaFave, 
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Search and Seizure § 11.4(a), at 249-250 ("Circumstances justifying application of the 
"inevitable discovery" rule are most likely to be present if [] investigative procedures 
were already in progress prior to the discovery via illegal means, as in Nix[], or where the 
circumstances are such that, pursuant to some standardized procedures or established 
routine a certain evidence-revealing event would definitely have occurred later.") 
(emphasis added). 
Defendant cites two Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals cases in support of her 
erroneously narrow view that "the [S]tate must establish by a preponderance of the 
evidence that the items in issue would have been discovered shortly (inevitably) through 
lawful means already under way." Cond. Cross-Resp. Br. at 6-7 (citing, e.g., United 
States v. Romero, 692 F.2d 699 (10th Cir. 1982), and United States v. Larsen, 127 F.3d 
984, 985 (10th Cir. 1997), cert, denied, 522 U.S. 1140 (1998)). However, these cases do 
not support defendant's proposition. Neither case requires proof of an alternative 
investigation underway at the time of the police illegality; in fact, Larsen's holding, the 
more recent of the two cases, is completely appositive. 127 F.3d at 986 ("[NJeither the 
majority opinion in Nix nor our cases limit the inevitable discovery exception to lines of 
investigation that are already underway. They require only that the investigation that 
inevitably would have led to the evidence be independent of the constitutional violation.") 
(citing Nix, 467 U.S. at 443). 
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Rather, Larsen, or the Tenth Circuit, is consistent with the majority of "inevitable 
discovery" cases. Unlike "independent source"cases, the issue in determining "inevitable 
discovery" is not what did occur in a separate untainted investigation, but what would 
occur if the investigation had continued without the illegality. Nix, 467 U.S. at 444 & 
459; Larsen, 127 F.3d at 987. Indeed, the classic "inevitable discovery" scenario 
involves the same officers, or at least officers working together, in a contemporaneous 
and continuous investigation. See, e.g., United States v. Haro-Salcedo, 107 F.3d 769, 
770 & 113-11A (10th Cir. 1997) (evidence found during illegal search of lawfully detained 
vehicle would have been inevitably discovered during subsequent inventory search by 
same officers); United States v. Griffin, 48 F.3d 1147, 1148-49 & 1151 (10th Cir.) 
(utilizing both "independent source" doctrine and "inevitable discovery" exception in 
determining that same officers and agencies would have continued investigation and 
discovered involvement of defendant despite prior illegal interrogation of co-defendant), 
cert, denied, 515 U.S. 1168 (1995); United States v. Williams, 980 F.Supp. 1225, 1227-
28 & 1231 (D. Utah 1997) (even if officer illegally entered vehicle, discovery of evidence 
was inevitable due to ultimate arrest of defendant and impound of vehicle by same 
officer), affirmed without published opinion, 183 F.3d 876 (10th Cir. 1999); State v. 
Sampson, 808 P.2d 1100 (Utah App. 1990) (court of appeals remands to allow 
prosecution to establish if same agency would have inevitably located body of missing 
child in dumpster if they had not illegally obtained incriminating statements from 
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defendant), cert, denied, 817 P.2d 327 (Utah 1991). See also Kennedy, 61 F.3d at 498-99 
(rejecting need for "alternate, independent line of investigation" for inevitable discovery 
and concluding that if police had not illegally searched, the airline would have routinely 
checked the suspect luggage). Thus, to the extent defendant has correctly characterized 
the authorities cited in her brief, see Cond. Cross-Resp. Br. at 6-7, they do not define the 
parameters of the inevitable discovery exception, but rather, represent only a 
"subcategory" of cases falling thereunder. James, 2000 UT 80, % 15; Larsen, 127 F3d at 
986. 
While the Tenth Circuit is not among them, a minority of courts do require proof 
that a lawful "inevitable" investigation was "on-going" or "underway" prior to the 
illegality. The minority view arose over a disagreement in the federal circuit courts as to 
what type of proof \§ necessary to establish that evidence would have been inevitably 
discovered. See Kennedy, 61 F.3d at 498-500 (discussing division among federal 
circuits). See also LaFave, Search and Seizure § 11.4(a), at 247-48. To minimize 
unjustified speculation on what "would" have occurred absent the illegality, some courts, 
lead by the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals, require objective proof that a legal 
investigation was in progress prior to the illegality. See, e.g.9 United States v. Hammons, 
152 F.3d 1025, 1029 (8th Cir. 1998) (finding a "substantial, alternate" line of investigation 
where the officer told defendant that if he did not consent to the search of his vehicle, the 
officer would call a drug-detection dog), cert, denied, 119 S.Ct. 1135 (1999). 
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As set out fully in the Brief of Conditional Cross-Petitioner at 16, the majority of 
courts follow the Tenth Circuit view which requires no absolute proof, beyond evidence 
of predictable police routine, of what would have hypothetically occurred absent the 
illegality: 
[T]he inevitable discovery exception applies whenever an independent 
investigation inevitably would have led to discovery of the evidence, 
whether or not the investigation was ongoing at the time of the illegal 
police conduct. 
Larsen, 127 F.3d at 986 (emphasis added) (even though legal process leading to 
discovery of documents did not begin until after the illegal seizure, testimony established 
that the legal discovery was inevitable). Thus, Larsen does not establish a new element 
for "inevitable discovery" but simply clarifies what Nix already required: the prosecution 
must demonstrate historical facts, as opposed to sheer "speculative elements," to support 
that hypothetically discovery would have inevitably occurred. Nix, 467 U.S. at 444 n.5. 
Accord State v. Genovesi, 909 P.2d 916, 923 n.8 (Utah App. 1995) ("inevitable 
discovery" requires the "evidence 'would' have been discovered, not simply that it 
'could' or 'might' have been discovered") (citation omitted). See also Kennedy, 61 F.3d 
at 498-500 (discussing conflicting views of federal circuits and then concluding that 
"inevitable discovery" only requires probability based on "compelling" facts that 
evidence would have been discovered lawfully).1 See also LaFave, Search and Seizure 
1
 Kennedy mistakenly lists the Tenth Circuit as a circuit requiring proof of an 
actual on-going "independent" investigation, citing United States v. Owen, 782 F.2d 146 
7 
§ 11.4(a), at 247. As set forth below, application of the clarified inevitable discovery 
exception to the record facts here demonstrates that the "routine" warrants check would 
have inevitably lead to defendant's arrest on outstanding warrants and the trial court's 
ruling should be affirmed on that alternative ground. 
RESPONSE TO DEFENDANTS OVERBROAD 
CHARACTERIZATIONS OF THE RECORD 
Before proceeding to an analysis of the inevitable discovery exception here, 
however, it is necessary clarify the record. Specifically, defendant broadly asserts that 
police routinely retain identification cards absent reasonable suspicion to run warrants 
checks. Cond. Cross-Resp. Br. at 4-5, 8, 10-11 (citing R88:15-16, 21-22, 28). Defendant 
also suggests that she was illegally detained here even before police retained her 
identification. Cond. Cross-Resp. Br. at 5, 8. Defendant's characterizations of the record 
are overbroad and belie her claim that the inevitable discovery exception cannot be 
successfully applied here. Cond. Cross-Resp. Br. at 9. 
First, defendant repeatedly asserts that "[b]oth officers [] testified that the manner 
in which they conducted the warrants check here constituted a "routine" or "common" 
practice." Cond. Cross-Resp. Br. at 4-5, 8, 10-11 (citing R88:15-16, 21-22, 28) (emphasis 
added). Based on this self-serving characterization of the record defendant concludes 
that, "[b]y their own admissions, these officers routinely violated the law to conduct a 
(10th Cir. 1986). However, Larsen, a later Tenth Circuit case, clarifies that Owens 
imposes no such requirement. Larsen, 127 F.3d at 987. 
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warrants check." Cond. Cross-Resp. Br. at 4. A careful reading of the record, however, 
illustrates that defendant's characterization is misleading. Neither officer testified that 
they routinely acted illegally, i.e., detained individuals without reasonable suspicion. 
Rather, the officers testified that running a warrants check on individuals they encounter 
is routine. For example, Sergeant Hansen responded affirmatively to defense counsel's 
question: "You called in for the warrants check as a matter of routine procedure?" 
(R88:16). Further, Officer Mitchell responded as follows to the prosecutor's query 
whether Sergeant Hansen uassign[ed him] any duties" with regard to their investigation of 
defendant: "As I walked up, he handed me her identification and I don't recall if he 
asked me to run her for warrants or if I just ran her for warrants. It's a common practice" 
(R88:21-22). Thus, while Sergeant Hansen agreed with defense counsel's 
characterization of the warrants check as "routine procedure," and Officer Mitchell 
similarly recognized that a warrants check is "common practice," neither officer testified 
that the "manner" in which the warrants check was conducted here, i.e., by retaining 
defendant's identification absent reasonable suspicion, was either routine or common 
(R88:16, 21-22, 27). Rather, it was the warrants check itself which was routine or 
common procedure (id.). Defendant's characterization of the record is therefore 
misleading. 
Second, defendant repeatedly states that police "violated [her] Fourth Amendment 
rights when they unlawfully detained her and retained possession of her identification to 
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run a warrants check." Cond. Cross-Resp. Br. at 5, 8 (emphasis added). To the extent 
defendant is suggesting there are other indicia of illegal detention in this case, her 
assertion is unsupportable. The court of appeals correctly recognized that the only 
mistake police made here was in retaining defendant's identification for the duration of 
the warrants check. See State v. Topanotes, 2000 UT App 311 at % 8 n.3, 14 P.3d 695, 
cert, granted, 29 P3d 1 (Utah 2001) (a copy of the court of appeals decision is contained 
in add. A, Cond. Cross Pet. Br.). There is no dispute that police could lawfully request 
defendant's name or identification pursuant to their investigation of the recently arrested 
prostitute. See Cond. Cross Pet. Br. at 17. Therefore, if police had merely viewed the 
identification, obtained defendant's name therefrom, and promptly returned it, the 
subsequent warrants check would not have "per se" escalate[d] the encounter into a level 
two stop." Salt Lake City v. Ray, 2000 UT App 55, % 13 n.2, 998 P.2d 274 (citations 
omitted). Thus defendant's voluntary encounter with police only rose to an illegal 
detention when, absent reasonable suspicion, police did not immediately return her 
identification. Id. (clarifying that retention of a suspect's identification must be supported 
by reasonable suspicion). To the extent defendant suggests otherwise, the suggestion is 
unsupportable and should be rejected on that ground. 
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RESPONSE TO DEFENDANT'S CHARACTERIZATION OF THE 
STATE'S INEVITABLE DISCOVERY THEORY: THE WARRANTS 
CHECK WAS AN ESTABLISHED ROUTINE THAT WAS GOING 
TO BE PERFORMED WHETHER DEFENDANT IDENTIFIED 
HERSELF VERBALLY OR VIA IDENTIFICATION 
The above record clarifications are important because defendant's overbroad 
characterizations erroneously suggest that police retention of her identification was 
necessary to the warrants check leading to her arrest on outstanding warrants. See Cond. 
Cross-Pet. Br. at 20 (citing authorities). Defendant's suggestion is mistaken. As fully set 
forth in the Brief of Conditional Cross-Petitioner at 18, a warrants check can be 
performed based solely on a suspect's name. Thus, police retention of defendant's 
identification was not necessary to the success of the instant warrants check which would 
have been performed even if defendant had had no identification on her person. Id. 
Defendant disputes that the warrants check would have been performed even 
without her identification and characterizes the State's inevitable discovery exception 
theory as "speculative"and "revisionist history." Cond. Cross-Resp. Br. at 8-10, 12. 
Specifically, defendant asserts that if police had "promptly return[ed her identification, 
she] was free to go"; therefore, defendant suggests police would not have had the 
information needed to run the warrants check. Cond. Cross-Resp. Br. at 8-10, 12. 
Defendant broadly concludes that "the record in this case could never support that the 
officers 'would' have run a warrants check through lawful means, once they already 
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conducted the check through unlawful means." Cond. Cross-Resp. Br. at 9. It is 
defendant's claims, however, that are speculative and unsupported. 
As set out previously, the issue in determining "inevitable discovery" is not what 
did occur in a separate untainted investigation, but what would occur if the investigation 
had continued without the illegality. Nix, 467 U.S. at 444 & 459; Larsen, 127 F.3d at 
987. In other words, "viewing affairs as they existed at the instant before the unlawful 
[seizure]," the Court must determine "what would have happened had the unlawful 
[seizure] never occurred." Kennedy, 61 F.3d at 497. There is no dispute that police 
lawfully inquired as to defendant's identity; therefore, the circumstances must be viewed 
as they existed at the instant before the only illegal action here—police retention of 
defendant's identification for the duration of the warrants check. Topanotes, 2000 UT 
App 311 at TJ 8 n.3. At that instant, defendant had already willingly identified herself to 
police and a routine warrants check was about to be performed (R88:10-14, 16, 22, 27). 
Precisely because defendant willingly turned over her identification and was cooperating 
with police, it is reasonable to assume that if she had had no identification, or if police 
had asked for her name instead of for her identification, defendant would have just as 
willingly verbally identified herself (id.). Accordingly, it is a reasonable inference from 
these facts that the remainder of the encounter would have proceeded unchanged: 
Defendant would have agreed—as she did here—to cooperate with police attempting to 
confirm her roommates' identity and residence, during which time police would have 
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completed the five minute warrants check (R88:11, 22). Thus, based on the record facts 
and reasonable inferences therefrom, the preponderance of the evidence suggests that 
defendant would have been willingly conversing with police—as she was here—when the 
outstanding warrants leading to her immediate arrest were discovered (id.). 
CONCLUSION 
The court of appeals' remand is superfluous on these facts. The outstanding 
warrants leading to defendant's arrest would have legally and inevitably been discovered 
as the result of a routine warrants check, even if defendant had had no identification on 
her person. Because defendant was cooperating in the police investigation of her 
roommate, she would have continued to be present at the scene when the warrants check 
revealed outstanding warrants for her arrest five minutes later. This Court should 
therefore affirm the denial of the motion to suppress on the alternative ground of 
inevitable discovery. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED ON _ X MaY 2 0 0 2 -
MARK L. SHURTLEFF 
Utah Attorney General 
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/ Assistant Attorney General 
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